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This paper presents the results of an analysis of data on individual bank loans of 
non-financial corporations in the Czech Republic taken from the CNB’s Central 
Credit Register. It focuses on the question of how firms obtain financing from 
domestic banks. The results show that the vast majority of non-financial 
corporations use the services of just one relationship lender. Small and young firms 
in technology- and knowledge-intensive industries tend to concentrate their credit 
needs in a single bank, whereas less creditworthy firms and firms in cyclical 
industries tend to borrow from more than one bank. The analysis also reveals 
different behaviour of firms towards financing banks in case of multiple lenders. 
Finally, the paper shows that the level of credit risk at bank level decreases in line 
with the extent to which firms applying single relationship lending occur in the 
bank’s portfolio. 
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The global financial crisis that started in summer 2007 has raised concerns about how banks 
trying to maintain sensible solvency and liquidity values will respond in their traditional 
portfolios, i.e. primarily in the segment of lending to non-financial clients. The signals so far 
suggest that banks have responded vis-à-vis their customers by tightening all three dimensions 
of their financial conditions, i.e. the volume of loans (or new loans), the interest conditions 
(higher interest rates) and the non-interest conditions (the collateral required and the 
proportion of project self-financing). From firms’ perspective, the situation may thus be 
highly unfavourable, as the critical situation in the financial markets coupled with high risk 
aversion reduces the opportunities for market financing using market instruments (bonds, 
equities and other securities). At times of financial turbulence, bank financing thus becomes 
the primary source of external finance again, giving banks a relatively strong position in 
determining the financial conditions.  
The financial conditions can also be affected by whether a firm borrows from just one 
relationship lender or whether it obtains financing from multiple banks. Relationship lending
1 
is most often cited as a phenomenon of the German banking system, but the available 
anecdotal evidence suggests that this model might be also present in other economies, 
including the Czech Republic. An important question is whether this bank financing model is 
beneficial to the firm at a time of economic crisis.  
                                                 
1 Some papers use the term „relationship banking“ (eg. Giovanni et al. 2001); we decided to use the term 
„relationship lending“ as we focus only on the lending side of a possible much richer relationship between firms 
and banks that could include also deposit accounts and investment banking services.   2
This paper sets out to determine which bank financing model predominates in the Czech 
Republic, what its main characteristics are, and what factors the choice of bank financing 
model depends on at firm level. We also analyse whether the model chosen has a significant 
effect on the credit risk of relationship lenders.  
This paper uses internal data from the database of the CNB’s Central Credit Register (CRC), 
which since 2002 has been recording all new credit relationships between companies and 
banks in the Czech Republic. These data have not previously been used for analytical 
purposes, so this paper represents the first research study drawing on this original source of 
data.
2  
Section 2 provides a short review of literature, while section 3 presents the CRC data used. 
Section 4 contains numerous descriptive statistics regarding the model of bank financing of 
firms in the Czech Republic. Section 5 analyses the determinants of the choice of the number 
of lending relationships at firm level, and section 6 tests the effect of the application of 
relationship lending on the credit risk of banks. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Review of literature 
Relationship lending may be the optimal financial strategy for many companies, as a 
relationship lender has a good knowledge of the firm’s credit history and performance and can 
react optimally to its evolving financing needs. From the bank’s perspective, relationship 
lending may be an attractive business strategy, since it maximises the benefits while 
minimising the necessary borrower monitoring costs. This reduces the main problem of 
banking business, namely the information asymmetry between borrower and lender. “Service 
packages” for businesses and “customised financing” are indeed a manifestation of a business 
model that focuses on a single bank winning a client and financing all its needs. A theoretical 
approach to different types of bank financing can be found in Janda (2007). 
According to the conclusions of previous studies, company characteristics and competition 
are important determinants of the bank-customer relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Nam, 2004; Elsas, 2005). These studies also reveal that companies with a relationship lender 
have easier access to loan financing (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff and Körting, 1998), 
although an effect on interest conditions has not been unambiguously proved (Stein et al. 
2007; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Gorton and Schmid, 1996).  
                                                 
2 A first version of this analysis was published as a special feature in the Czech National Bank’s Financial 
Stability Report 2008/2009 (Geršl and Jakubík 2009).   3
It is relevant to ask whether relationship lending is beneficial to the firm during a recession. 
This would be true if the above arguments concerning easier access to financing apply even at 
times of financial distress. Giovanni et al. (2001) tested impact of relationship lending on 
small and medium-sizes firms in Korea during financial crisis of 1997-1998. They pointed 
out, that relationship lending with surviving banks has positive effect on firms during 
financial crisis. They argue that for many viable small and medium-size firms in Korea, 
relationship lending reduced liquidity constraints and thus diminished the probability of firms’ 
bankruptcy. However, one counter-argument is that the consequences of cancelling a line of 
credit to a company may be greater in the case of relationship lending, because the company 
has no credit history with any other bank and so its chances of raising alternative bank 
financing under reasonable interest conditions are reduced. Nevertheless, this argument has 
not been empirically confirmed in literature. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) define relationship lending as a situation where there are close ties 
between the firm and the lender. The usual indicator of this model is the number of lenders, 
with the existence of just one bank corresponding to relationship lending. However, for large 
firms, which often use the services of multiple banks, this indicator is too restrictive. Even if it 
uses multiple banks, the firm may have a truly close, tight and long-term relationship with just 
one lender. The existing literature offers three main indicators of close ties: (a) the number of 
lending relationships, (b) the share of the most significant bank in the company’s total debt, 
and (c) the duration of the main lending relationship (Ongena and Smith 2001; Memmel et al. 
2007). The share of the most important bank turns out to be the indicator with the highest 
information value for close ties between a company and a bank (Elsas, 2005). 
There are not many research studies that would focus on the relationship between the model 
of bank financing and credit risk. Theoretical approaches to this research question support the 
argument that banks that apply a business model focusing on relationship lending tend to 
experience lower credit risk in their portfolios (von Thadden 2004).
3 An area of research that 
relates bank financing and credit risk is the soft budget constraint literature arguing that 
especially in emerging market economies where alternative external corporate financing is not 
available, weak (state-owned) banks, have incentives to fund projects with negative net 
present value, leading to accumulation of credit risk (Dewatripont and Maskin 1995).
4 
                                                 
3 The logic is explained in Section 6. 
4 For a recent discussion of soft budget constraint literature see Janda (2009).   4
Empirical studies that relate the bank financing model and bad loans accumulation include 
Diaz-Alejandro (1985) or Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999). 
Some literature emphasizes positive aspects of single relationship lending. This relationship 
allows creditors to take a longer view on investments and reduce financial constraints for 
firms in temporary difficulties (Rajan, 1992, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1991). For this 
reason, single bank relationship is proposed as an optimal model for transition economies, 
where external non-banking sources of financing are limited (Aoki and Patrick 1994).  
3. Data  
The CNB’s Central Credit Register contains data on all balance sheet (and some off-balance 
sheet) exposures of domestic banks (including branches of foreign banks) to resident and non-
resident legal entities and to sole traders. Each record (line in the database) is a loan-specific 
record containing bank, firm, month and year, and a number of firm-, bank- and loan-specific 
information. The data are at monthly frequency. The register has been established at the end 
of 2002 and contains not only all new loans provided since that date, but also all at the end of 
2002 already existing bank loans. For example, the oldest loan that was (in December 2002) 
registered in the Credit Register has been provided to a Czech company in 1990. The database 
is thus not truncated, with the exception of loans provided and repaid before 2002. The 
reporting of loan data is not subject to any reporting limit.
5 
Anonymised data on the bank loans (balance-sheet exposure) to non-financial corporations 
were used for the analysis. Loans to non-residents, sole traders, the public sector and financial 
institutions were not taken into account. In all, the sample contained almost 8 million records 
describing the individual loans of around 120,000 companies in the period from December 
2002 to December 2008 in monthly frequency.  
For each firm, there is information on size (total turnover and number of employees), 
industry, legal form and ownership (public, private-domestic, private-foreign). The banks do 
not report data on companies‘ balance sheet or performance to the register, thus basic data on 
companies are uploaded to the register from a firms‘ register RES operated by the Czech 
Statistical Office. This has three main shortcomings: first, the data on companies from the 
RES are uploaded every month and the characteristics of firms are always overwritten with 
                                                 
5 The only exception are overdrafts at current accounts to an amount of 70 euros which are not reported.   5
the newest record.
6 Second, the data on size (total turnover and number of employees) are 
given only in categories (16 categories of turnover and 20 categories of number of 
employees). For the analysis, we replaced the number of the category with a mean value of 
each category. Finally, the data on size (either employment or turnover) are available only for 
about half of the firms (60 thousand companies).  
Using the information on each firm’s loans, we constructed variables describing the number 
of lending relationships, debits/overdrafts as a percentage of total debt, FX loans as a 
percentage of total bank loans, the year of the oldest granted loan, the firm’s “age” (computed 
as the difference between the year of the observation and the year of the oldest granted loan) 
and client creditworthiness (using information on the default rate in previous years). For each 
firm, we also created variables related to their three most important lenders (in terms of the 
banks’ share in the firm’s total borrowings from domestic banks), namely the amount of the 
share, selected data on the bank and selected data on the credit relationship with that bank, i.e. 
the above mentioned characteristics of the relationship (debt and foreign currency ratios, year 
of oldest loan and information on default).  
Finally, we created variables at individual bank level, i.e. the 12M default rate in the corporate 
loan portfolio
7, the bank’s market share in total loans to non-financial corporations, and the 
shares of various types of debtors and selected sectors and loans in the total corporate loan 
portfolio (foreign currencies, foreign-controlled corporations, small and medium-sized 
enterprises, etc.). Due to anonymised dataset, we did not have the identities of individual 
banks. The only thing we have for the banks is the bank group (large banks, medium-sized 
banks, small banks and foreign bank branches). 
To be able to run regressions, the dataset was further adjusted along two areas: first, the size 
of the dataset had to be reduced. Thus, the original monthly frequency was changed to 
quarterly frequency. Given that the data are stock data, this change did not lead to any need 
for recalculations. Second, the dataset was split to “firms dataset” and “banks dataset”) to be 
able to run panel data models, similarly to Memmel (2007, p. 10). 
4. Model of bank financing of firms in the Czech Republic 
                                                 
6 Thus, these firms‘ characteristics are time-invariant. For example, if a firm changed ownership from private-
domestic to private-foreign, the credit register would ovewrite the older records (domestic owenrship) with the 
newer one (foreign ownership) in all months over the whole life of the loan.  
7 The 12M default rate was computed as the proportion of the bank’s claims that will fall into the category “in 
default for more than 90 days” within 12 months.   6
For the purposes of this paper we use two indicators of relationship lending, namely the 
number of lending relationships and the share of the most significant bank. For the latter, we 
additionally construct a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the share of the main 
bank is more than 80%. In the text that follows, “single relationship lending” refers to the 
situation where a firm borrows from a single bank. The situation where one bank has a 
dominant share in a company’s borrowings (more than 80%) we term “dominant relationship 
lending”.
8 
The analysed data on the number of lending relationships reveal that relationship lending 
predominates in the Czech Republic. At the end of 2008, 85% of all non-financial 
corporations had just one lender, 12% had two and only around 3% had three or more (see 
Chart 1). Over the past six years, however, single relationship banking has been declining in 
significance, as almost 90% of companies were applying this model in 2002. 
Chart 1: Proportion of companies by number of lending relationships 
(% of total number of companies in given period) 



















One lending relationship (left-hand scale)
Two lending relationships (right-hand scale)
Three or more lending relationships (right-hand scale)
 
It is interesting to compare this figure with Germany, which is considered by theoreticians and 
practicians alike to be the classic example of single relationship lending (the Hausbank 
model). In a study based on the Deutsche Bundesbank credit register, Memmel et al. (2007) 
state that only around 45% of companies in 2002 applied single relationship lending (see 
Table 1).
9 A comparison of the distribution of the number of lending relationships between 
the Czech Republic and Germany reveals that German firms use the services of multiple 
                                                 
8 Another suitable indicator to measure relationship lending could be the Herfindahl index of concentration of 
creditors. However, in this study, we do not use this measure of lender’s concentration, leasing it for follow-up 
research. 
9 Memmel et al. (2007) analyzed bank loans from the Deutsche Bundesbank credit register for a period 1993-
2004, but the frequency was only yearly.   7
banks to a far greater extent.
10 This difference may be partly due to the different relative size 
of corporations and banks. Germany has far more large enterprises and small regional banks, 
so consortium financing is the only option for many large companies.
11 
Table 1: Comparison of distribution of number of lending relationships between Czech Republic 
and Germany 
CZ (2008) CZ (2002) Germany (2002)
1 85.0 88.0 43.5
2 12.2 9.8 23.2
3 2.2 1.7 11.4
40 . 4 0 . 4 5 . 8
50 . 1 0 . 1 3 . 8
60 . 0 0 . 0 3 . 3
70 . 0 0 . 0 2 . 1
80 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 4
90 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 1
10+ 0.0 0.0 4.3
Source: CNB (CRC), authors' calculations; Memmel et al. (2007) 
No. of lending relationships
in % of all companies
 
In the other indicator of relationship lending, i.e. the share of the most important bank in a 
company’s total bank debt, the proportion of companies applying dominant relationship 
lending is of course even higher (see Chart 2). But this indicator is declining over time as 
well. In Germany, the figure is somewhere between 50% and 60% (Schmieder et al., 2008). 
For the Czech Republic, the mean share of the most important bank (for the whole sample of 
all companies regardless of number of financing banks) is almost 97%, which is, of course, 
due to the high proportion of firms with a single relationship lender, with a range of 14% to 
100%. Stein et al. (2007) report an average for this indicator of around 60% (with a minimum 
of 9% and a maximum of 100%). 
 
                                                 
10 Memmel et al. (2007) report a maximum value for the variable “number of lending relationships” of 197. In 
the Czech Republic the maximum number is 11.  
11 This reason is supported by the fact that the data used for the analysis of Germany in Memmel et al. (2007) 
come from the Deutsche Bundesbank credit register, which only contains loans that exceed EUR 1.5m, i.e. loans 
primarily to large corporations.   8
Chart 2: Proportion of companies applying dominant relationship lending 
(% of total number of companies in given period) 
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Given that single relationship lending prevails among Czech firms, it is not surprising that 
large banks
12 dominate as single relationship lenders (see Chart 3). Roughly 70% of 
companies with single relationship lenders choose a large bank as their only bank, while 
around 20% choose a medium-sized bank. The role of branches of foreign banks and small 
banks is limited in this regard.
13 This is somewhat surprising as the evidence from Germany 
shows that usually smaller and middle-sized banks act as relationship lenders. The reasons 
might include factors related to competition among the smaller banks, preference to limit 
concentration, institutional factors and legislative environment.
14  
                                                 
12 The group „large banks“ consists of the four largest banks in the Czech Republic according to total assets. 
Their joint market share in the relevant loan market segment (loans to non-financial corporations) was around 
66% and surprisingly stable over all 7 years of data availability. 
13 The role of medium-sized banks was not significantly reduced by the change of form of Citibank from a 
medium-sized bank to a branch of a foreign bank in 2008. 
14 Some of the factors could be tested via including more variables for banks, such as the assets or equity of 
banks; unfortunately, as the dataset was anonymised and these data were not available in the credit register, this 
has to be left for follow-up research.   9
Chart 3: Single relationship lenders by bank category 
(percentage of companies with single relationship lender from given group) 
 
Source: CNB (CRC), authors' calculations
Note: The chart does not contain building societies, whose role as 
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The data offer more interesting information on which first and second most important banks 
are chosen by firms using multiple banks. The role of foreign bank branches, for instance, 
could be greater here, since these banks offer companies certain specialised services. The 
average share of the first most important bank (for firms that have more than one relationship 
lender) in the total debt of the firm is 77% and the share of the second relationship lender is 
20%. Table 2 shows the distribution of firms with two relationship lenders by the group of the 
first and second relationship lender. It turns out that large banks also have the largest share in 
the role of second bank, including for firms that already have a large bank as their first lender.  
As the lending services offered to firms by all the large banks are broadly similar, firms may 
opt for the “large–large” combination as a strategy for avoiding the problem of being 
“captured” by one relationship lender (Schmieder et al. 2008). Memmel et al. (2008) show on 
German data that firms applying single or dominant relationship lending reduce their share 
with the largest bank in favour of another bank over time as they grow. The firm’s bargaining 
position as regards lending conditions thus improves over time, as its credit history is known 
to more than one bank. This has been theoretically described as a “hold-up” problem for 
example in Bannier (2009). 
Table  2 also shows that the second most common combination of relationship lenders is 
large–medium-sized or medium-sized–large (with a very similar number of firms), followed   10
by foreign bank branch–large (or large–branch). In these cases, a greater role is probably 
played by the firm’s specific requirements, geographical location (accessibility of the bank), 
efforts made by banks to target specific clients and, for foreign-controlled corporations, 
existing ties between the firm’s owners and the bank. 
Table 2: Distribution of relationship lenders by bank group for firms with two relationship lenders 









Large banks 35.2 19.1 2.3 5.4
Medium-sized banks 19.1 3.3 0.7 1.7
Small banks 2.2 0.7 0.1 0.3
Foreign bank branches 6.8 1.9 0.4 0.5




























For the sake of completeness, we should mention that for firms using the services of three or 
more banks, large banks again play the most important role, followed by medium-sized banks 
and foreign bank branches. The most common bank combination for these firms is thus large–
large–large. The factors here may include the firm’s size (the need for syndicated financing in 
large firms) and the strategy of avoiding capture and cutting financing costs, although 
historical ties may also play a role. The largest banks were all to some extent specialised in 
the past decade, so companies used the services of large banks for different purposes 
(payments, investment vs. operating vs. export financing, etc.). Owing to the conservative 
nature of large domestic firms, these ties apparently still survive, even though these banks 
now operate essentially as universal banks offering practically every banking service. 
The CRC contains information on whether a company borrows in the form of an overdraft or 
debit balance. This is an indirect indicator that the firm also has a current account with a 
particular bank and that it therefore uses the bank for routine payments with other trading 
partners. The data reveal that firms applying dominant relationship lending have a higher 
share of overdrafts and debit balances in their total bank debt than companies that do not 
apply this model (50% versus 36% of total bank debt). This may be linked with company size, 
since dominant relationship lending is applied more by small firms (see below). They usually 
have more volatile revenues, as they have a smaller number of clients, and so they are forced 
to use overdraft or debit facilities more often for their day-to-day operations.    11
For firms using multiple banks, detailed data on their lending relationships allow us to analyse 
whether firms behave differently towards different banks. In the case of overdrafts and debit 
balances, it turns out that firms obtain overdrafts from their main bank to a lesser extent than 
from other banks in the sequence (Table 3).  
Table 3: Differences in behaviour towards various relationship lenders 
(average indicators in %) 
Share of overdrafts and debit balances in bank debt
Total 1st bank 2nd bank Total 1st bank 2nd bank 3rd bank
2002 44,6 27,9 27,9 41,2 13,1 11,8 20,3 28,4
2005 57,9 42,7 41,6 56,0 30,2 27,8 35,3 44,5
2008 46,5 37,3 35,7 53,4 32,3 30,8 38,0 49,0
Share of foreign currency loans in bank debt
Total 1st bank 2nd bank Total 1st bank 2nd bank 3rd bank
2002 8,8 8,0 7,8 8,8 11,4 11,9 11,0 15,4
2005 5,4 3,3 3,2 4,6 6,0 6,1 5,9 6,3
2008 3,5 2,7 2,8 3,2 4,3 4,4 4,3 6,0







Two relationship lenders Three or more relationship lenders
Two relationship lenders Three or more relationship lenders
 
One of the reasons may be that second and subsequent relationship lenders finance 
companies’ other needs (in particular operations), in which overdrafts naturally have a greater 
weight. Moreover, firms may behave more cautiously towards their main bank in the 
overdraft area and probably do not make full use of overdraft or debit facilities. This 
behaviour has not changed significantly over time, even though the rate of overdraft use has 
changed. 
Similar behaviour can be observed for the share of FX loans. The average share of FX loans 
in firms’ total bank debt has steadily decreased from around 9% in 2002 to 3.5% in 2008.
15 
This share differs little between firms applying dominant relationship lending and other firms, 
but firms with three or more banks have a higher share of FX loans than firms with two 
relationship lenders (see Table 3). These tend to be larger firms with a strong export 
orientation. It also turns out that in the case of multiple bank financing the share of FX loans 
is usually higher for more distant banks. This is to some extent consistent with the finding that 
foreign bank branches, which specialise in providing FX loans or financing international 
trading, tend to occupy second or third place in the order of financing importance.  
                                                 
15 This is the unweighted average. The decline is due to a decrease in this share in individual firms and partly 
also to the appreciation of the Czech koruna against other currencies, as well to a change in the set of firms 
towards a higher proportion of (for example smaller) firms using mostly koruna loans. The relatively small 
average amount of this share (as compared to the often cited share of FX loans in total loans provided by 
domestic banks of around 30%) is due to the high proportion of smaller firms with mostly koruna loans.    12
The final issue in the area of firms’ different behaviour towards different banks is their 
strategy in the event of repayment difficulties. An analysis of the data reveals that firms with 
two relationship lenders tend to default with their main bank (on average almost 50% of firms 
with repayment difficulties) and keep up their repayments with the second bank. A further 
30% of firms stop repaying both banks simultaneously.
16 At first glance, this situation 
contrasts with the conclusions of the analysis of behaviour in the area of debit balances and 
overdrafts, where firms try to maintain a good credit history with their main bank. A more 
detailed analysis reveals, however, that firms defaulting primarily with their main bank 
likewise use overdraft and debit facilities with them to a greater extent. In the case of three or 
more relationship lenders, the situation is heterogeneous and no dominant model of behaviour 
can be identified. In percentage terms, the most frequently observed phenomenon is default 
with all three relationship lenders (around 22% of cases), followed by default with the first 
two banks (20% of cases) and default with the first bank (16% of cases). 
17 
5. Analysis of the determinants of the choice of single relationship lending 
Empirical studies analysing the determinants of the choice of bank financing model by 
individual firms (Memmel et al., 2007) find a particularly important role for the size, age and 
creditworthiness of the firm, the technology and knowledge intensity and cyclicality of the 
industry, and the type and size of the lender/lenders. The industry- and firm-level 
characteristics indicate a positive correlation between a firm’s size and age and its number of 
lending relationships, and a negative correlation between the creditworthiness of the firm and 
the technology and knowledge intensity of the industry and the number of lending 
relationships. Stein et al. (2007) set out detailed arguments from the theoretical literature 
supporting these correlations, arguments that are based to a large extent on the problem of 
information asymmetry and strategic behaviour of firms. The geographical location of the 
firm may also play a role, as firms from smaller communities away from financial (regional) 
centres may tend to borrow from the single bank that is most accessible to them. For foreign 
firms, ties between parent companies and foreign banks may also play a role. It is reasonable 
                                                 
16 At the end of 2008, this situation switched towards equal default vis-à-vis both relationship lenders (50% of all 
firms in default in 2008 Q4). 
17 Unfortunately, the credit register does not include variables on bank’s size, ownership, performance and the 
structure of balance sheets, so a number of potentially important research questions related to different behaviour 
to different lenders is not analyzed.   13
to assume, therefore, that Austrian firms, for instance, will borrow mainly from banks owned 
by Austrian banking groups.
18 
We analyse the determinants of the choice of bank financing model using classical regression 
(the pooled OLS method), fixed-effects panel regression and random-effects panel regression 
in order to capture the effects of variables that do not vary over time.
19 The share of the main 
relationship lender in the firm’s total bank debt (i.e. actually the loan concentration) was used 
as the dependent variable.
20 The explanatory variables used were firm characteristics 
(turnover, age of firm, risk of firm), selected industry-level variables, namely the cyclicality 
of the industry (the correlation between the industry’s gross added value and overall GDP) 
and a dummy variable for high and medium-high technology and knowledge intensity 
industries.
21  As the effect of firm size on bank loan concentration may be non-linear, a 
dummy variable was used for medium-sized and large firms.
22 
The regression results confirm that larger and older enterprises have less concentrated loans 
and hence a greater number of relationship lenders (Table 4).
23 Some non-linearity of the 
effect of firm size on the share of the largest relationship lender was also confirmed, although 
its size is relatively small (about 2 percentage points). Firms in technology- and knowledge-
intensive industries tend to concentrate their borrowing needs in one bank, whereas firms with 
lower creditworthiness as measured by the default rate in the past two years borrow from 
more than one bank (although this fixed-effects model does not find a significant effect). The 
results are consistent with findings for the German economy (Memmel et al., 2007; Stein et 
al., 2007).  
Table 4: Regression results for bank financing model 
                                                 
18 Variables capturing corporations’ geographical ties and countries of origin were not available, so the influence 
of these factors was not tested in the analysis.  
19 The firm size information does not vary over time as it is taken from the turnover categories in the RES 
(Register of Economic Agents) database and is always overwritten in the CRC historical data by the latest 
information.  
20 Alternatively, we also used the number of banks the firm borrows from. Given the nature of this variable, 
which takes discrete values between 1 and 11, in this case we used Poisson regression, which takes the 
categorical nature of the dependent variable into account. The results, however, are in line with the 
aforementioned findings.  
21 See CZSO, Klasifikace zpracovatelského průmyslu podle technologické náročnosti [Classification of 
manufacturing by technology intensity] and Klasifikace odvětví služeb podle znalostní náročnosti [Classification 
of services by knowledge intensity]. 
22 Other than given variables proved to be insignificant. Descriptive statistics of relevant variables used in the 
regressions can be found in Appendix.  
23 Information on turnover is not available for all firms, so the regressions using this variable were performed 
only on a subsample containing roughly half the number of firms.   14
(OLS, fixed-effects model (FE) and random-effects model (RE) 
  







0.0289*** -0.0388*** -0.0338*** -0.0124***
[0.00061] [0.0014] [0.0011] [0.00087]
-0.00840*** -0.00758*** 0.000294 -0.00330***
[0.00069] [0.00069] [0.00087] [0.00078]
-0.0192*** -0.0140*** -0.0217***
[0.00041] [0.00043] [0.00096]
0.969*** 0.941*** 0.982*** 1.003***
[0.00057] [0.00067] [0.00081] [0.00092]
Industry dummies no yes no no
No. of observations 717346 717346 717346 717346
No. of firms 63088 63088 63088 63088
R-squared 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.01
Standard error in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Risk of firm (past default rate)




Dummy for technology- and knowledge-intensive 
industries 
Cyclicality of industry
As regards the industry’s cyclicality effect, Stein et al. (2007) do not find a significant effect 
of this variable for German firms. The OLS results without industry dummies and the two 
panel estimates on the other hand differ in our case and are significant in both cases. 
Economic intuition would suggest that firms in procyclical industries should use multiple 
relationship lenders and have less concentrated loans, as indicated by the panel estimate 
results, because banks do not like to be the single relationship lenders of too procyclical and 
hence relatively risky firms. It might be that some of the firms (or industries) are responsible 
for this result, so we run OLS with industry dummies. In this case, the results are compatible 
with the panel regression results (Table 4). 
6. Effect of application of single relationship lending on banking portfolio risk  
Does a bank’s orientation towards clients applying dominant relationship lending have an 
effect on its portfolio risk, and is that effect positive or negative? The above analysis of the 
determinants of the choice of relationship lending model showed that firms with higher 
creditworthiness (lower default risk) tend to concentrate their loans in a single dominant 
relationship lender.
24 According to von Thadden (2004) this is consequence of a dynamic 
process where creditworthy clients stay with their main relationship lender while 
uncreditworthy clients switch to the model of multiple relationship lenders. Over time, the 
                                                 
24 Although the fixed-effects panel regression results did not support this conclusion, the alternative estimates of 
the effect of this variable on the number of relationship lenders confirm it.   15
higher proportion of firms applying dominant relationship lending with such lenders should 
thus give rise to a lower corporate portfolio default rate. However, large firms, which are 
generally less risky but due to their size are often financed by syndicated loans from several 
banks, may have the opposite effect. 
To answer this question, we performed a panel regression in which the dependent variable 
was the default rate in banks’ corporate loan portfolio. The explanatory variables used were 
portfolio characteristics, macroeconomic indicators and in particular an indicator for the 
bank’s orientation towards “single” clients as measured by the ratio of loans to clients 
applying dominant relationship lending to the bank’s total loan portfolio (Table 5).
25 
The panel regression results reveal that an orientation towards clients applying dominant 
relationship lending has a positive effect on the bank’s loan portfolio quality. This result can 
be explained by a better knowledge of such clients by the bank and more effective risk 
management in this segment and is largely in line with the theoretical literature (Rajan, 1992; 
von Thadden, 2004).  
Behr et al. (2007) discuss the benefits of specialization versus diversification of banks. 
However, concentrating on relationship borrowers cannot be interpreted as pure specialization 
strategy, as the relationship borrowers can come from different industries and have different 
characteristics. Thus, by focusing on relationship borrowers, the banks can reap benefits of 
diversification as well. 
The panel regressions containing all the banks did not prove any dependence of their credit 
risk on the economic cycle as measured by GDP growth.
26 This is largely due to the inclusion 
of numerous small and medium-sized banks, whose share in the credit risk of the banking 
sector’s total loans is relatively negligible. However, these banks, given their relatively small 
loan portfolios, different strategies and specialisations in selected segments of the economy, 
can show relatively sizeable changes in portfolio structure and performance that are not 
primarily correlated with the economic cycle.
27 If we perform this regression for large banks 
only, dependence on the economic cycle is confirmed. 
                                                 
25 Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the regressions can be found in Appendix. 
26 The other macroeconomic variables were either insignificant or had a sign inconsistent with economic 
intuition. 
27 Some small and medium-sized banks, for example, applied an aggressive strategy to win market share, leading 
to growth in the credit risk of their portfolios at times when the economy was growing strongly.   16
Table 5: Panel regression results for credit risk 
(fixed-effects model; all banks excluding banks with zero default rate) 
 













No. of observations 412 100
No. of banks 17 4
R-squared 0.06 0.25
Standard error in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
GDP growth (y-o-y)
Constant
Share of clients applying dominant 
relationship banking 
Share of small corporations in total 
portfolio
Share of foreign-controlled corporations 
in portfolio
Share of forex loans in portfolio
 
An orientation towards small firms fosters a higher default rate, although this factor is 
reflected in higher client interest rates. Moreover, single or dominant relationship lending, 
where the main bank knows the company well and is better able to manage the risks, 
predominates in small companies. A lower default rate is fostered by greater orientation of 
banks towards foreign-controlled corporations and a lower proportion of FX loans. The last 
two factors, however, are insignificant in large banks. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper provided the first evidence on relationship lending in the Czech Republic using 
data on individual bank loans of non-financial corporations in the Czech Republic taken from 
the CNB’s Central Credit Register. These data have not previously been used for analytical 
purposes, so this paper represents the first research study drawing on this original source of 
data. 
 
The results of the analysis of the model of bank financing of firms in the Czech Republic 
revealed a high relevance of single (sole) relationship lending. This model is applied primarily 
by small and young firms in technology- and knowledge-intensive industries. By contrast, less 
creditworthy firms and firms in cyclical industries tend to borrow from more than one bank.  
The data also revealed that firms applying relationship lending have a higher share of 
overdrafts and debit balances in their total bank debt than companies that do not apply this 
model. This may be linked with company size, since relationship lending is applied more by   17
small firms which usually have more volatile revenues are forced to use overdraft or debit 
facilities more often. 
The analysis showed that for firms with more than one lending relationship, the most common 
combination is to have two large banks as main lenders. Medium-sized banks and foreign 
banks branches occupy more distant places in the order of financing importance. As the 
lending services offered to firms by all the large banks are broadly similar, this might indicate 
that firms opt for the “large–large” combination as a strategy for avoiding the “hold-up” 
problem of being “captured” by one relationship lender. The firm’s bargaining position as 
regards lending conditions improves if its credit history is known to more than one bank.  
For firms using multiple banks, it was shown that firms behave differently towards different 
banks in terms of the extent to which banks use overdrafts or FX loans. Interestingly, as 
regards the firms’ behaviour towards different banks in the event of repayment difficulties, 
the data indicates that a half of firms with two relationship lenders tend to default with their 
main bank and keep up their repayments with the second bank.  
The paper also analyses whether the financing model chosen has a significant effect on the 
credit risk of relationship lenders. It turns out that the level of credit risk at bank level 
decreases in line with the extent to which firms applying single relationship lending occur in 
the bank’s portfolio. This result can be explained by a better knowledge of such clients by the 
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Appendix 
 
Table A: Descriptive statistics of variables used in regressions 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Firm's variables
Turnover in CZK mil 88.46 261.55 0.10 2000.00
No of employees 51.13 264.02 0.00 12000.00
Age of the firm in years 8.90 4.99 1.00 19.00
Cyclicality of the industry (correlation with the GDP) 0.77 0.22 -0.31 0.95
Risk of firm (past default rate) 0.09 0.26 0.00 1.00
Year of the oldest loan 2000.10 4.99 1990.00 2008.00
Total debt in CZK mil 124.00 990.00 0.00 134000.00
Share of FX loans in the fim's debt 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
Share of overdrafts in the firm's debt 0.50 0.48 0.00 1.00
No of financing banks 1.18 0.50 1.00 11.00
Share of main relationship lender 0.97 0.11 0.14 1.00
Bank's variables
Bank's 12M default rate 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.41
Share of clients applying dominant relationship banking  0.61 0.25 0.05 1.00
Share of small corporations in total portfolio 0.41 0.31 0.00 1.00
Share of foreign-controlled corporations in portfolio 0.27 0.25 0.00 1.00
Share of forex loans in portfolio 0.18 0.22 0.00 0.99
Macroeconomic variables
GDP growth (y-o-y) in the CZ 5.04 1.49 1.80 6.90
GDP growth (y-o-y) in the euro area 1.90 0.87 0.30 3.40
Exchange rate CZK/EUR 29.07 2.45 24.09 32.86
Inflation (y-o-y) in the Czech Republic 2.72 2.02 -0.35 7.35
3M Pribor 2.71 0.76 1.75 4.21
3M Euribor 3.14 1.06 2.03 5.02  
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